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SPOUSE'S FRAUD AS A BAR TO INSURANCE RECOVERY
In Rockingham Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hummel,I the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that an innocent wife was not entitled to keep
her share of the proceeds from a homeowners policy insuring real
property owned by both spouses as tenants by the entirety when the
loss was caused by the wrongful act of her husband.2 The home of
Harold Lee and Mildred Hummel was destroyed by fire in April
1975. At that time, a Rockingham Mutual Insurance Co. homeown-
ers policy was in force that protected the Hummels from loss by fire.
Pursuant to the policy, the insurer paid $21,600 to the Hummels for
the damage caused by the fire.
Subsequently, however, the insurer discovered that the husband
intentionally had set fire to the property and brought suit against
both husband and wife to recover the entire sum paid. Sustaining
the wife's demurrer, the trial court dismissed the action against
her.' On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and re-
manded the case,' ruling that the trial court had erred in dismissing
the insurer's claim against the wife.
The issue of whether fraud by one insured spouse will bar recovery
of insurance proceeds by both was one of first impression in Vir-
ginia. Courts in other jurisdictions that have addressed the question
have reached conflicting results.5 Nevertheless, the court in
Rockingham disposed of the issue summarily, stating simply that
"the legal interest in the subject matter of this policy was joint and
not severable." 6 The court also stated that each spouse had a joint
duty to refrain from defrauding the insurer and to use all reasonable
means to preserve the property after the fire began.7 As a result of
this joint duty, fraud by either spouse constituted a breach of the
1. 219 Va. 803, 250 S.E.2d 774 (1979).
2. Id. at 807, 250 S.E.2d at 776.
3. Id. at 804, 250 S.E.2d at 775.
4. Id. at 807, 250 S.E.2d at 776.
5. More recent cases have held that the innocent spouse is entitled to recover his or her
share of the proceeds. Hildebrand v. Holyoke Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329 (Me. 1978);
Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 130 N.J. Super. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (1974), modifying 124 N.J.
Super. 414, 307 A.2d 142 (1973). Other jurisdictions, however, have reached the opposite
result, denying recovery by the innocent spouse. E.g., Kosior v. Continental Ins. Co., 299
Mass. 601, 13 N.E.2d 423 (1938); Klemens v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 565, 99 N.W.2d
865 (1959).
6. 219 Va. at 806, 250 S.E.2d at 776.
7. Id.
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contract chargeable to the "Named Insured," and barred recovery
by either spouse.8 This Comment will examine the analysis used by
the court in Rockingham and the propriety of that decision. Such
an examination indicates that the court should have interpreted
ambiguous language in the insurance contract in a reasonable man-
ner most favorable to the innocent coinsured spouse. By following
this reasoning, the court would have permitted recovery to Mrs.
Hummel and thus reached a more equitable result.
NATURE AND CONSTRUCTION OF PROPERTY INSURANCE POLICIES
An insurance policy is a contract of indemnity between an insur-
ance company and an insured,9 and is subject to the same rules that
govern other contracts unless those rules are modified specifically
by statute.'0 In the absence of fraud or mistake, the insured appli-
cant is bound by the provisions of the contract and cannot claim
that he failed to read the terms or did not know the scope of the
coverage."
The general rule of construction for interpreting any insurance
policy is that the contract is to be construed strictly against the
insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.12 The existence of this
8. Id.
9. See generally 4 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 2105 (1969).
10. This general rule applies to fire as well as to other types of insurance policies. E.g.,
Carter v. Carter, 202 Va. 892, 896, 121 S.E.2d 482, 485 (1961) (fire insurance policy); Harleys-
ville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dollins, 201 Va. 73, 77, 109 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1959) (automobile collision
policy); Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Roberts Lumber Co., 119 Va. 479, 495, 89 S.E. 945, 948
(1916) (fire insurance policy); Norfolk Fire Ins. Co. v. Talley, 112 Va. 413, 415, 71 S.E. 534,
535 (1911) (fire insurance policy); Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Devore, 88 Va. 778, 783, 14 S.E.
532, 533 (1892) (life insurance policy); United States Mut. Ass'n v. Newman, 84 Va. 52, 58, 3
S.E. 805, 807 (1887) (accident insurance policy).
11. E.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. Morris Oil Co., 233 F.2d 291, 293 (4th Cir. 1956); Carriers
Ins. Exch. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 203 F Supp. 764, 766 (W.D. Va. 1962), aff'd, 310 F.2d 653
(4th Cir. 1962); see Ashby v. Dumouchelle, 185 Va. 724, 733, 40 S.E.2d 493, 497 (1946). This
rule, however, is not ironclad; reformation is permitted when provisions in the contract have
been inserted by mutual mistake of the insured and the insurer. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Morris
Oil Co., 233 F.2d at 294; Carriers Ins. Exch. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 203 F Supp. at 766; see,
e.g., Bankers Fire Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 196 Va. 195, 205-06, 83 S.E.2d 424, 430 (1954).
12. See, e.g., White v. Blue Cross, 215 Va. 601, 602, 212 S.E.2d 64, 65 (1975) (health
insurance policy); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 170 Va. 312, 327, 196 S.E. 641, 647 (1938) (fire
insurance policy); Collins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 163 Va. 833, 839, 178 S.E. 40, 42
(1935) (life insurance policy); Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Fansler, 143 Va. 884, 891, 129 S.E.
727, 729 (1925) (fire insurance policy); United States Mut. Ass'n v. Newman, 84 Va. 52, 59,
3 S.E. 805, 808 (1887). The modem viewpoint differs from early decisions that held that courts
should construe contracts objectively and in favor of neither the insurer nor the insured.
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rule, however, does not guarantee that the insured will recover re-
gardless of the wording of the insurance contract. An insurance
policy must be construed reasonably; 3 therefore, if the language is
clear and unambiguous, the courts are without power to make a new
contract or to alter the old one and must adhere to the wording of
the contract as an accurate representation of the actual intent of the
parties." If the wording is ambiguous, however, and the insurance
policy has two reasonable and possible interpretations, the court
will adopt that which favors the insured 5 and avoids a forfeiture."
Merchants Ins. Co. v. Edmond, Davenport & Co., 58 Va. (17 Gratt.) 138, 145 (1866). The
rationale for the present rule is twofold. First, because the purpose of contracts of insurance
is to indemnify an insured for damages, these contracts should be enforced whenever possible.
Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Elder, 204 Va. 192, 197, 129 S.E.2d 651, 655 (1963); Dressler v.
Reserve Life Ins. Co., 200 Va. 689, 692, 107 S.E.2d 406, 408 (1959); Ayres v. Harleysville Mut.
Cas. Co., 172 Va. 383, 389, 2 S.E.2d 303, 307 (1939). Second, the insurance company drafts
the contracts and often includes complex clauses that the insured seldom reads; the insured
must accept the policy as written if he wishes to be protected. Harrison v. Provident Relief
Ass'n, 141 Va. 659, 671, 126 S.E. 696, 700 (1925) (quoting Stratton's Adm'r v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 115 Va. 257, 270, 78 S.E. 636, 640 (1913)). Because much of the language found in
insurance policies today is required by statute, see, e.g., VA. CoDn §§ 38.1-349, -365, -366, -
390 (Repl. Vol. 1976), the second rationale for construing an insurance policy strictly against
the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured is now less compelling. An insurance company
could argue that provisions written by the elected representatives of the public should not
be construed strictly against the insurer. This argument also has been countered:
Insurance contracts continue to be contracts of adhesion, under which the
insured is left little choice beyond electing among standardized provisions of-
fered to him, even when the standard forms are prescribed by public officials
rather than insurers. Moreover, although statutory and administrative regula-
tions have made increasing inroads on the insurer's autonomy by prescribing
some kinds of provisions and proscribing others, most insurance policy provi-
sions are still drafted by insurers. Regulation is relatively weak in most instan-
ces, and even the provisions prescribed or approved by legislative or administra-
tive action ordinarily are in essence adoptions, outright or slightly modified, of
proposals made by the insurers' draftsmen.
Under such circumstances as these, judicial regulation of contracts of adhe-
sion, whether concerning insurance or some other kind of transaction, remains
appropriate.
Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HRv. L. Rav. 961, 966-
67 (1970) (footnote omitted).
13. E.g., Harmon v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 172 Va. 61, 65, 200 S.E. 616, 618
(1939); Hamburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co. v. Browning, 102 Va. 890, 894, 48 S.E. 2, 3 (1904);
Niagara Fire Ins. Co, v. Elliott, 85 Va. 962, 963, 9 S.E. 694, 695 (1889). See also Kennard v.
Travelers' Protective Ass'n, 157 Va. 153, 160 S.E. 38 (1931).
14. Carter v. Carter, 202 Va. 892, 896, 121 S.E.2d 482, 485 (1961); see National Fire Ins.
Co. v. Dervishian, 206 Va. 563, 566, 145 S.E.2d 184, 186 (1965); Harmon v. Farm Bureau Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 172 Va. 61, 65, 200 S.E. 616, 618 (1939).
15. E.g., National Fire Ins. Co. v. Dervishian, 206 Va. 563, 567, 145 S.E.2d 184, 187 (1965);
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dollins, 201 Va. 73, 77, 109 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1959); Ayres v.
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ROCKINGHAM MUTUAL INSURANCE Co. v HUMMEL
The court in Rockigham reached its decision without any discus-
sion of the general rules of construction and interpretation of insur-
ance contracts. Instead, the court relied on the general rule that the
right of an innocent coinsured to compensation under a fire insur-
ance policy when the other coinsured has committed arson depends
upon whether the interests of the two parties are joint or severable .17
Concluding that the interests in Rockingham were joint and not
severable, the court denied recovery to the innocent wife.18
The Nature of the Property Interest
The court in Rockingham first supported its decision on the basis
that the Hummels' interests in the property were indivisible be-
cause the Hummels held as tenants by the entirety 1 Courts in other
states similarly have denied recovery to an innocent coinsured
spouse on this basis."0 The court in Rockingham, however, relied not
on the decisions of these courts, but primarily on the holding of the
Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 172 Va. 383, 389, 2 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1939).
16. E.g., Williams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 139 Va. 341, 349, 123 S.E. 509, 512 (1924);
Virginia Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 90 Va. 658, 662, 19 S.E. 454, 456 (1894); Lynch-
burg Fire Ins. Co. v. West, 76 Va. 575, 585 (1882); see White v. Blue Cross, 215 Va. 601, 602,
212 S.E.2d 64, 65 (1975). Construing the language of a contract to avoid forfeiture fulfills the
indemnifying purpose of insurance. See note 12 supra.
17. 219 Va. at 805, 250 S.E.2d at 776. When the interests and obligations of the coinsured
parties are joint, the innocent coinsured is not allowed to recover his share of the proceeds;
when the interests are divisible, recovery is allowed. The courts, however, have been unable
to agree on the definition of joint interests and obligations. See, e.g., Hildebrand v. Holyoke
Mut. Ins. Co., 386 A.2d 329 (Me. 1978) (holding that the innocent wife could recover on a
policy when the husband had set fire to the house); Kosior v. Continental Ins. Co., 299 Mass.
601, 13 N.E.2d 423 (1938) (holding that the innocent spouse could not recover because the
form of the contract and the legal interests in the property were joint); Hoyt v. New Hamp-
shire Fire Ins. Co., 92 N.H. 242, 29 A.2d 121 (1942) (holding that the innocent tenant in
common could recover his share of the proceeds); Howell v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 130 N.J.
Super. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (1974), modifying 124 N.J. Super. 414, 307 A.2d 142 (1973) (holding
that the innocent spouse could recover under a policy listing husband "and/or" wife as the
"Named Insured"); Matyuf v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 351 (1933) (holding that
the innocent spouse could not recover under the policy); Klemens v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 8
Wis. 2d 565, 99 N.W.2d 865 (1959) (holding that the innocent spouse could not recover under
the policy).
18. 219 Va. at 806, 250 S.E.2d at 776.
19. Id.
20. E.g., Kosior v. Continental Ins. Co., 299 Mass. 601, -, 13 N.E.2d 423, 424 (1938);
Matyuf v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 351, - (1933); Bridges v. Commercial
Standard Ins. Co., 252 S.W.Zd 511, 512 (Tex. Ct. App. 1952).
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Wisconsin Supreme Court in Klemens v. Badger Mutual Insurance
Co." in reaching its conclusions.
22
Although Klemens also involved the right of an innocent spouse
to recover proceeds on jointly owned property when loss resulted
from fraud by the other spouse,3 reliance on this case was mis-
placed. The court in Klemens barred recovery by the innocent
spouse not on the basis of the indivisibility of the joint interests in
the insured property, but because of the joint duties of the comsured
parties to comply with the terms of the policies.24 Indeed, the court
in Klemens emphasized the immateriality of the nature of the prop-
erty interest in the secured property 2 Furthermore, the Superior
Court of New Jersey in Howell v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. ,5
cited the reasoning of Klemens in allowing the innocent wife to
recover even though both spouses held the property as tenants by
the entirety 27
Courts invoking property interest concepts as the basis for deny-
ing recovery to an innocent spouse make no reference to insurance
law to support their decisions. Instead, these courts rely exclusively
on the idea that jointly owned land must create an insurable interest
that is also joint.2 That such an emphasis is misguided is indicated
by the traditional characterization of a fire insurance policy as a
personal contract indemnifying the insured party for loss to his
insurable interest and not as one providing proceeds on the property
itself. 2 Thus, application of insurance contract principles as utilized
by the courts in Klemens and Howell provides a better reasoned
approach to resolving the issue of an innocent spouse's right to
recover insurance proceeds when the property is destroyed by the
fraud of the other spouse. Because insurance contract principles and
not property law provide the proper line of inquiry, the court in
Rockingham erred when it used the indivisibility of property inter-
21. 8 Wis. 2d 565, 99 N.W.2d 865 (1959).
22. 219 Va. at 806, 250 S.E.2d at 776.
23. 8 Wis. 2d 565, - , 99 N.W.2d 865, 866 (1959).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 130 N.J. Super. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (1974), modifying 124 N.J. Super. 414, 307 A.2d 142
(1973).
27. Id. at -, 327 A.2d at 242.
28. See note 20 supra & accompanying text.
29. By not allowing a joint interest in property to foreclose recovery, this reasoning also
supports the public policy purpose of insurance, which is to provide indemnity. See note 12
supra.
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ests as the basis for denying recovery Proper insurance contract
analysis would have permitted Mrs. Hummel to retain the pro-
ceeds.30
The Form of the Policy
The court in Rockingham also cited the form of the policy to
support its decision. The policy listed "Harold Lee and Mildred
Hummel" as the "Named Insured;" therefore, the court held that
the obligations and duties of the coinsured parties under the con-
tract were joint.3 1 A violation of these duties by either insured was
deemed chargeable to both, thus barring recovery by the innocent
insured.2 The court cited only a short passage from Klemens as
support for this conclusion.3 Despite the court's reliance on this
passage, principles of contract law applicable to insurance contracts
indicate that the court would have found firmer support for a con-
trary holding and thereby would have produced a more equitable
result.
The court in Rockingham found that two clauses in the homeown-
ers policy were relevant to its conclusion. The first completely
voided the policy in case of fraud by "the insured", the second
relieved the insurance company of any liability if "the insured"
failed to exercise care in preserving the property at and after the
loss. 4 The Hummels' policy also contained a clause that defined the
30. In addition, under Virginia law, Mrs. Hummel could have obtained a separate insur-
ance policy on her interest in the property owned jointly by her and her husband. The Code
of Virginia states that a person must have an insurable interest in property in order to qualify
as a beneficiary under a property insurance policy. VA. CODE § 38.1-331 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
An insurable interest is defined as "any lawful and substantial economic interest in the safety
or preservation of the subject of insurance free from loss, destruction or pecuniary damage."
Id. This statutory section codifies previous case law. See Home Ins. Co. v Dalis, 206 Va. 71,
75, 141 S.E.2d 721, 724 (1965). Prior cases had held that any legal or equitable interest,
including an undivided interest in property, created an insurable interest. See Liverpool &
London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Bolling, 176 Va. 182, 188, 10 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1940); Palmetto
Fire Ins. Co. v. Fansler, 143 Va. 884, 895, 129 S.E. 727, 728 (1925). Mrs. Hummel's interest
undeniably was a "substantial economic interest" in the property. If she had had a separate
policy, she could have recovered for the damage to her interest despite her husband's fraud.
The court should not deny recovery simply because the Hummels obtained one insurance
policy instead of two.
31. 219 Va. at 806, 250 S.E.2d at 776.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 804-05, 250 S.E.2d at 775. These standard provisions were required by statute.
The Code of Virginia provides in relevant part:
[Vol. 21:543
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unqualified word "Insured" as including the "Named Insured" and
any relatives of the named insured living in the household."
Defintin of "the Insured"
The court's holding in Rockingham hinged on its conclusion that
the Hummels violated the joint duties to exercise care and not to
commit fraud." Unfortunately, the court did not analyze carefully
the wording of the insurance policy Both the fraud and neglect
provisions triggered forfeiture only when committed by "the in-
sured."37 The critical inquiry here is a determination of to which
parties the term refers. Although the unqualified word "insured" is
defined in the policy," the two words "the insured" are not, and the
court equated the latter wording with the former.
Courts in other states have been unable to agree on a definition
of the term "the insured." In Assurance Co. v. Bell,3" the Court of
Appeals of Georgia interpreted a homeowners liability policy to re-
quire the company to pay all sums that the insured was legally
obligated to pay as a result of bodily injury or property damage to
others. In addition, the policy provided that the insurance company
could settle a claim for damage to property with "the insured or the
This entire policy shall be void if, whether before or after a loss, the insured has
wilfully concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance concern-
ing this insurance or the subject thereof, or the interest of the insured therein,
or in case of any fraud or false swearing by the insured relating thereto.
This Company shall not be liable for loss by fire or other perils insured against
in this policy caused, directly or indirectly, by: (i) neglect of the insured
to use all reasonable means to save and preserve the property at and after a loss,
or when the property is endangered by fire in neighboring premises
VA. CODE § 38.1-366 (Repl. Vol. 1976) (emphasis supplied).
35. The relevant portion of the policy provided:
-When used in this policy the following definitions apply:
a. "Insured" means
(1) The Named Insured stated in the Declarations of this policy;
(2) if residents of the Named Insured's household, his spouse, the relatives of
either, and any other person under the age of twenty-one in the care of any
Insured.
Romeowners policy issued to Harold Lee and Mildred Hummel (this provision is located on
the third page of Exhibit A introduced at trial in Rockingham Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hummel).
36. 219 Va. at 806, 250 S.E.2d at 776.
37. See note 34 supra & accompanying text.
38. See note 35 supra & accompanying text.
39. 108 Ga. App. 766, 134 S.E.2d 540 (1963).
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owner thereof."40 The court concluded that "[t]he language 'an
insured' makes the company liable for damage caused by any person
included in the omnibus clause, while the language 'the insured,'
referring to settlement of claims, is ambiguous, since it may mean
either the named insured or the insured actually causing the
damage."' Conversely, in G. C. Kohlmier, Inc. v. Mollenhauer,42 the
Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded that the term "the insured"
was unambiguous.43 The court held that this term, when used in an
automobile liability policy that excluded from its coverage injury to
any employee of the insured referred to both the named insured and
the omnibus4 insured. 5 Other courts have encountered similar diffi-
culties in interpreting the term "the insured."46
The court in Rockingham should have addressed the meaning of
the term "the insured." In so doing, it could have permitted recov-
ery by Mrs. Hummel through one of two avenues. If the court had
found the term ambiguous, it should have followed the holding in
Assurance Co. v. Bell47 and resolved that ambiguity in favor of the
insured by preventing a forfeiture." Alternatively, had the court
concluded that the term was unambiguous, two interpretations fa-
vorable to Mrs. Hummel were possible. The court could have
40. Id. at - , 134 S.E.2d at 543.
41. Id. (emphasis supplied).
42. 237 Minn. 126, 140 N.W.2d 47 (1966).
43. Id. at - , 140 N.W.2d at 52.
44. Omnibus provisions in automobile liability insurance policies are required by statute
in many states. Such provisions extend the coverage provided for the named insured to
anyone operating the named insured's automobile with his permission. See, e.g., VA. CODE §
38.1-381 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
45. 237 Minn. at - , 140 N.W.2d at 50. Despite the conclusion that "the insured" was
an unambiguous term, the decision by the court in Kohlmier was favorable to the named
insured. This interpretation meant that exclusion from coverage applied not only to an
employee of the named insured but also to any employee of a permittee of the named insured.
Given this broader exclusion, the insurance company would not be required to indemnify
injured parties in as many cases, and the premiums required from the named insured would
be lower.
46. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Wabash Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 264 F Supp.
637, 643 (D. Minn. 1967) (holding that the term "the insured" in an exclusion provision in
an automobile liability policy referred to both the insured seeking the protection under tthe
policy and to the named insured); Marwell Constr., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London,
465 P.2d 298, 305 (Alaska 1970) (holding that the term "the insured," as used in an exclusion
provision denying coverage to any employee of "the insured," referred only to the person
seeking coverage).
47. See notes 39-40 supra & accompanying text.
48. See notes 12, 15, 16 supra & accompanying text.
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adopted the Kohlmier determination that "the insured" refers to all
parties insured under the contract. Thus, to trigger the forfeiture
provision of the Hummels' contract, fraud would have had to have
been committed by both spouses.
A second interpretation is suggested by the reasoning of the Su-
preme Court of New Hampshire in Pawtucket Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Lebrecht.49 In Pawtucket, the court construed the term "the in-
sured" in a manner most favorable to the insured by acknowledging
that the term could have different meanings depending on which
provision of the contract was being interpreted." A husband and
wife were the named insured under a comprehensive homeowners
liability policy When the son of the named insured, himself an
omnibus insured, committed an intentional assault, the injured
party sued the parents for failure to supervise the son adequately 1'
The parents sought insurance coverage under their policy but the
insurer argued that the policy specifically excluded any coverage for
damage intentionally caused by "the insured." 2
Although conceding that for some purposes of the policy "the
insured" might refer to any of the parties insured under the con-
tract, the court found that in the exclusion provision reference to
"the insured" meant only the particular insured party committing
the act.53 Thus, the court found that although the son's act would
deny him coverage under the policy because the intentional act was
his, no such forfeiture operated as to the parents who were innocent
of any intentional wrongdoing.54 To construe "the insured" most
favorably to Mrs. Hummel, the court thus could have applied the
reasoning of Pawtucket, reading the exclusion provision to deny
coverage only to "the insured" who committed the fraud or neglect.
In order to determine which interpretation of the term "the in-
°sured" was correct, the court in Rockingham should have analyzed
carefully the articles "the" and "an." The generally accepted rule
recognizes the use of "the" before a noun for a particularizing or
specifying effect, and the use of "a" or "an" in an indefinite or
49. 104 N.H. 465, 190 A.2d 420 (1963).
50. Id. at -, 190 A.2d at 422-23.
51. Id. at -, 190 A.2d at 423.
52. Id. at -, 190 A.2d at 422.
53. Id. at -, 190 A.2d at 423.
54. Id. at -, 190 A.2d at 422.
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generalizing sense.5 For example, in Dooley v. Penland,5" the Su-
preme Court of Tennessee addressed a provision of a will that re-
quired the trustee of the decedent's property to use "the interest"
and as much of the principal as was necessary to support the dece-
dent's widow The court held that in this context, "the interest"
should be construed as meaning all of the interest and not merely a
part of it.
In another insurance coverage situation, the Supreme Court of
Iowa considered a clause in a fire insurance policy that voided the
policy if "the property" was mortgaged or encumbered. In Born v.
Home Insurance Co.,51 the court construed the language of the pol-
icy as follows:
That the words "the property" were intended to include all the
property is indicated in what immediately precedes as to other
insurance "on any said property " The use of "the" in the one
instance and "any" in the other surely indicates an intention to
express something different, and the same is true of the use of the
word "any" in respect to change in title or possession. "The prop-
erty" is without qualification, and we think must be held to refer
to all the property insured, and therefore mortgaging or encum-
bering a part of it did not work a forfeiture of the entire policy.59
The policy issued to the Hummels by the Rockingham Mutual
Insurance Co. defined the unqualified word "insured" as including
55. United States v. Hudson, 65 F 68, 71 (W.D. Ark. 1894), appeal dismissed, 17 S. Ct.
994 (1897); Brooks v. Zabka, 168 Colo. 265, - , 450 P.2d 653, 655 (1969); see People v.
Enlow, 135 Colo. 249, -, 310 P.2d 539, 546 (1957); Lowry v. City of Mankato, 231 Minn.
108, -, 42 N.W.2d 553, 558 (1950). The Virginia Supreme Court, by implication, agreed
with this position when it held in a larceny case that two separate acts of asportation were
not "the same act" for purposes of determining whether the criminal defendant had been
subjected to double jeopardy. Jones v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 757, 240 S.E.2d 658 (1978),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 909 (1978). But see Stevens v. Duncan, 189 Ga. 730, -, 7 S.E.2d
745, 746 (1940) (holding that under a statute allowing nonresidents to act as executors of a
resident's will when the executor has "the interest in the estate" of the deceased, the word
"the" should be interpreted as meaning "an"); Howell v. State, 164 Ga. 204, -, 138 S.E.
206, 210 (1927), appeal dismissed, 275 U.S. 576 (1927) (holding that the term "the" generally
determines the particular thing meant but that in the proper circumstances it may also mean
"more than one" or "any").
56. 156 Tenn. 284, 300 S.W 9 (1927).
57. The court was influenced by the use of the qualifying phrase "as much of as may
be necessary" before the word "principal." This phrase did not precede the word "interest."
Id. at - , 300 S.W at 11-12.
58. 110 Iowa 379, 81 N.W 676 (1900).
59. Id. at -, 81 N.W at 678 (emphasis supplied).
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"the named insured."60 A reasonable interpretation of "the in-
sured," a term never defined in the Hummels' policy, would have
included all "the named insured" parties collectively 61 The reason-
ing of the courts in Pawtucket, Dooley, and Born suggests that so
allowing Mrs. Hummel recovery would have been the correct deter-
mination. " The articles "a" and "an," words generally Meaning a
single or any one of a great number, 3 preceded the word "insured"
in several clauses in the Hummels' policy 61 Because the words "a"
and "an" could have been used to define and limit the term
"insured" to a single insured, the court in Rockingham should have
construed the term "the insured" as meaning the named insured
parties collectively 65 Under this construction, fraud by one insured
spouse would not have been imputed to the other spouse. Only a
fraud perpetrated jointly by the parties listed as "named insured"
would have voided the policy as to both; therefore, the innocent
spouse would have been allowed to keep her share of the proceeds.
A conclusion that fraud by one spouse would not void the policy
as to both still would deny recovery to the spouse who committed
the fraud. Although the insurance policy would remain in force, the
60. See note 35 supra.
61. The policy is void only if fraud or neglect is committed by "the insured." See note 34
supra. One could argue that if the term "the insured" did not include all insured parties, the
Hummels could have committed fraud jointly and not have been barred recovery by any
language in the policy because no forfeiture provision applied to them. Clearly, however, such
an interpretation would violate the common law principle that a wrongdoer should not profit
from his wrongful acts.
62. See notes 49, 56, 58 supra & accompanying text.
63. People v. One 1940 Buick Sedan, 71 Cal. App. 2d 160, -, 162 P.2d 318, 320 (1945);
see, e.g., United States v. St. Clair, 62 F Supp. 795, 797 (W.D. Va. 1945); First Trust Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Armstrong, 222 Iowa 425, - , 269 N.W 502, 506 (1936); Ebeling v.
Bankers' Cas. Co., 201 P 284, 285 (Mont. 1921); People v. Ogden, 8 App. Div. 464, -, 40
N.Y.S. 827, 828 (1896); Deschane v. McDonald, 86 N.W.2d 518, 520 (N.D. 1957).
64. The policy contained the following provisions:
a. to bodily injury to any person, including a residence employee or an insured
farm employee, if any person or organization has a policy providing workmen's
compensation or occupational disease benefits for such bodily injury or if bene-
fits for such bodily injury are in whole or in part either payable or required to
be provided under any workmen's compensation or occupational disease law;
b. to bodily injury to
(1) any insured under parts (1) and (2) of the definition of "Insured"
Homeowners policy issued to Harold Lee and Mildred Hummel (provision located on the
seventh page of Exhibit A introduced at trial in Rockingham Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hummel).
65. This is a reasonable interpretation of "the insured." The policy defined "Insured" as
"The Named Insured." See note 35 supra. "The Named Insured" was defined as "Harold Lee
and Mildred Hummel." See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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culpable insured could not recover when his willful act caused the
damage or injury This rule would apply even in the absence of a
clause in the insurance contract denying recovery 86
Policy Considerations
The above interpretation of the term "the insured" best fits the
rules that ambiguous terms or clauses in an insurance policy should
be construed in favor of the insured 7 and that forfeitures of insur-
ance policies are not favored." This conclusion is proper even
though the wording "the insured," as found in the fraud and negli-
gence provisions of the policy issued to the Hummels, is required by
statute. 9 When the insurer drafted the insurance policy, it could
have defined the complete term "the insured" as meaning "a named
insured" or "any named insured." Such a definition would have
voided the entire policy if only one of the named insured parties had
committed a fraud. Instead, by choosing to define only the unquali-
fied term "insured," the insurer created an ambiguity that the court
in Rockingham should have resolved in favor of the innocent in-
sured.
A rule allowing the innocent spouse to recover, however, might
conflict with the rule in some jurisdictions that if personal property
is held by the entirety, insurance proceeds received because of the
destruction of such property also are held by the entirety 70 Although
the Supreme Court of Virginia has not ruled on this specific ques-
tion, in Oliver v. Givens7 it held that the proceeds from the volun-
tary sale of property held by the entirety also were held by the
entirety and were immune from the claims of the individual credi-
tors of one of the spouses. In order to protect a married couple from
the claims of individual creditors, the Supreme Court of Virginia
doubtless would follow the same reasoning in dealing with the pro-
ceeds from a fire insurance policy
66. Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139, 153-54 (1897); Orient Ins. Co. v. Cox, 218
Ark. 804, -, 238 S.W.2d 757, 759 (1951); Fedele v. National Liberty Ins. Co., 184 Va. 528,
35 S.E.2d 766 (1945); Bellman v. Home Ins. Co., 178 Wis. 349, -, 18 N.W 1028, 1028
(1922).
67. See note 15 supra & accompanying text.
68. See note 16 supra & accompanying text.
69. See note 34 supra.
70. E.g., Cooper v. Cooper, 225 Ark. 626, _, 284 S.W.2d 617, 620 (1955).
71. 204 Va. 123, 129 S.E.2d 661 (1963).
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A holding in Rockingham allowing Mrs. Hummel to retain her
share of the proceeds from the policy nevertheless would have been
consistent with the policies underlying the holding in Oliver Al-
though the court in Oliver held that the proceeds from the property
were held by the entirety, the decision is distinguishable from
Rockingham, in Oliver, neither spouse committed fraud. Under the
suggested holding, Mrs. Hummel would have retained her recovery
as her sole property because the recovery would have been based on
the damage to the value of her interest in the property 72 Further-
more, the rule in Oliver sought to protect the coinsured spouses from
the claims of individual creditors that arose simply because the
entirety property was destroyed through no fault of the insured
parties. Clearly, a holding in Rockingham allowing Mrs. Hummel
to keep her share of the insurance proceeds as her sole property
similarly would have protected the interest of the innocent com-
sured spouse.73
CONCLUSION
The court in Rockingham erred when it failed to analyze the
contract implications of the insurance policy issued to Mr. and Mrs.
Hummel. Because this was a case of first impression in Virginia
concerning an issue addressed in only a few jurisdictions, a careful
analysis of contract rules as they apply to insurance law would have
been appropriate. Instead, the court relied almost exclusively on the
conclusions of the Klemens decision, holding that the obligations to
exercise care during the fire and not to commit fraud were joint, and
denying recovery to the innocent spouse. An analysis of the applica-
ble contract rules would have led the court to conclude that the
insurance contract was ambiguous and thus should have been inter-
preted in a reasonable manner most favorable to the innocent coin-
sured spouse. Based on this conclusion, the court should have held
that the duties under the policy were not joint, but severable, and
thus reached the more equitable result.
S. P C.
72. See note 29 supra & accompanying text.
73. Such a result also would have aided in preventing certain frauds. One spouse would
be less likely to conspire with the other to defraud an insurance company if refusal to partici-
pate in that wrong would permit the innocent spouse to recover his or her share of the
proceeds.
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